Cyprus assumed the Presidency of the Council of the European Union at a turbulent moment for our region, our continent, and the world. Owing to geography, history, and division, Cyprus has the motivation and experience to champion migration policies which balance compassion and control.
A MedMA analysis revealed that Cyprus processed 7.2 asylum applications per 1,000 inhabitants in 2024, nearly three-and-a-half times the EU average. Cypriot authorities have worked to reduce irregular arrivals, speed up asylum procedures, and increase the number of returns, combining forced deportations with voluntary repatriation programs. Cyprus is also due to adopt a national integration strategy to promote cohesion and development. The country is also due to soon join the Schengen area, a development that perfects its EU integration but may pose political and technical challenges due to the continued occupation of the island’s north.
One of the presidency’s standout moments comes on 12 June, when the full operational framework of the new Pact on Migration and Asylum is set to come into full effect. The Pact introduces an EU-wide list of safe countries of origin and a revised safe third country concept. Cyprus, as a priority beneficiary of the new ‘solidarity pool,’ is also a suitable setting to discuss how to strengthen the responsibility-sharing aspects of the Pact.
Cyprus will also take the lead on another Pact, the one for the Mediterranean. As ten of the EU’s Southern Mediterranean neighbours may join EU leaders in April, the next six months are an opportunity to recast migration policy toward genuine partnership rather than unilateral securitisation. Genuine responsibility-sharing, mobility pathways at scale, and win-win approaches to third-country partnerships can strengthen Mediterranean integration and resilience in the interest of both Cyprus and the wider EU.
EU policymakers will continue their discussions on external processing, as several EU member states look towards the controversial Italy-Albania deal as a potential model. So far, these debates focus on the question of returns and whether ‘return hubs’ could increase the number of failed asylum seekers that leave the EU. Member states should also explore new legal pathways and other forms of support to refugees outside the EU. These could use existing tools, such as humanitarian corridors and community sponsorship, to restore democratic consent in refugee protection.
The question of the long-term future of Syrian refugees is important to Cyprus, as it promotes voluntary returns and circular mobility options. These should continue to complement, not replace, continued protection in Europe until Syria becomes a stable and safe place. At that point, a European approach that empowers Syrians with portable social benefits, professional credential recognition, and start-up capital could transform return from a leap of faith into a rational, de-risked choice for those who genuinely wish to rebuild Syria.
The long-term future of Ukrainians is also an urgent question facing EU leaders. As President Zelenskyy said in Nicosia earlier this month, “this war may end during [Cyprus’] presidency.” The Council of the EU has recently adopted a set of recommendations to allow eligible Ukrainians to transition to other legal residence statuses within the EU, while also supporting reintegration and voluntary returns. There is urgent work ahead to find specific tools which support the interests of both Ukraine and its displaced people.
Cyprus’ presidency arrives at a defining moment for European migration policy. The country’s experience navigating profound challenges—from managing disproportionate asylum flows to balancing security with humanitarian obligations—positions it uniquely to advance genuine responsibility-sharing. Success requires moving beyond securitisation toward partnerships that promote safe mobility and build Mediterranean resilience for the long term.